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In this paper we provide an empirical link between the processes of skill
upgrading and occupational mobility. An increase in the relative employment
of skilled workers may be achieved either by replacing less-skilled workers with
more-skilled workers, or by increasing the skill-level of workers already em-
ployed. Skill upgrading therefore has an ambiguous eﬀect on the occupational
mobility of individual workers. We use comparable individual-level panel data
from the US and the UK to relate the probability of individual occupational
moves to the speed of skill upgrading at the industry level. We ﬁnd that in both
samples the speed of skill upgrading has a positive impact on the probability of
moving up the occupational ladder, while it has less impact on the probability
of moving down or of leaving employment. This suggests that the process of
“skill upgrading” is not necessarily detrimental to the labour market outcomes





There is a large body of evidence documenting the shift in demand away from un-
skilled and towards skilled workers in many OECD countries. See, for example
Murphy & Welch (1993) and Berman, Bound & Griliches (1994) for US evidence;
Berman, Bound & Machin (1998) for international evidence. It is generally accepted
that this process of “skill upgrading” has been an important element in the increas-
ing wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, and the increasing share of
employment taken by skilled workers in OECD economies.
It is also well known that there is considerable movement of individual workers
between skill-levels, both within and between ﬁrms. For example, Gibbons & Wald-
man (1999) summarises the literature on careers within organisations, while Farber
(1999) summarises the evidence on the mobility of workers between ﬁrms.
In this paper we link these two literatures on skill upgrading and occupational mo-
bility to consider how the process of skill upgrading impacts on the movement of
individual workers between skill levels or occupations. We seek to determine the
importance of industry-level shifts in demand for diﬀerent types of workers on the
occupational mobility of individuals. This is an important issue for two reasons.
First, because it sheds light on the mechanism by which skill upgrading is achieved.
In a model such as Mortensen & Pissarides (1998) the arrival of a new technology
causes some current matches between workers and ﬁrms to become unproﬁtable.
Firms can then choose whether to dissolve the match and exit production, or to
invest in some renovation cost in order to continue production with the same worker.
One obvious aspect of this renovation cost is the cost of retraining the worker to
be able to use the new technology. Clearly the impact on the individual worker
will be very diﬀerent in these two cases. In the ﬁrst, an increase in the rate of
technological change (and hence in the rate of skill upgrading) will cause job loss and
the interruption of individual careers. In the second case, however, skill upgrading
may be positively associated with “career progression” in the sense that workers
move to a higher skill level to accommodate the increased demand for higher skill
workers.
Second, this analysis helps us to identify who the winners and losers are from the
skill upgrading process. The choices of ﬁrms to destroy matches or upgrade their
workforce will vary with the relative costs of job destruction or retraining, which
will in turn vary across worker and job types.
One aspect of occupational mobility which has been considered rather less is the
2possibility that workers move to a lower skilled job. The process of skill upgrading
may also have an impact on the probability that an individual moves to a lower skill
level. If we view skill upgrading as occurring when old jobs are destroyed and new
(higher skill) jobs are created, then an increase in the rate of skill upgrading can
also cause dislocation of workers and subsequent downgrading.
To investigate these issues we use individual-level panel data from both the United
States and the United Kingdom, taken from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We use individual-level
panel data because we need to be able to identify the occupational movements of
workers over time. The use of comparable cross-country data provides us with an
opportunity to explore the robustness of our conclusions across two entirely separate
labour markets, both in terms of the extent of skill upgrading and also its impacts.
For each individual in employment over the period 1991–2001 we deﬁne a current
level of “skill” which is intended to be internationally consistent. We then record
the extent of movement between these skill groups over annual intervals, and we
examine (a) how much of the movement is likely to be caused by measurement error
and (b) whether this movement has measurable impacts on wages. We then use
these same skill deﬁnitions to measure the extent to which skill upgrading occurs
in 18 broadly deﬁned industries. We then estimate the partial relationship between
these industry-level measures of skill upgrading and the probability of occupational
mobility at the individual level, controlling for other observable factors.
2 Some relevant literature
As noted by Machin (2001): “A by now large academic literature has documented
the changing demand for skills in many countries and has looked at the key factors
underpinning the observed changes.” Much of this literature stems from Berman
et al. (1994), and is largely empirical, although some concept of skill-biased techno-
logical change is often cited as the most likely explanation (Card & DiNardo 2002).
An important conclusion from this literature is that the great majority of skill up-
grading has occurred within rather than between industries, suggesting that shifts
in demand across industries is not the primary cause. Berman et al. (1998) extend
the analysis of skill upgrading to ten developed countries, and ﬁnd that those indus-
tries with signiﬁcant technological innovation made the largest contribution towards
within-industry skill-upgrading.
There is rather less research which deals with the issue of how ﬁrms (or industries)
3adjust towards a more highly-skilled workforce. One relevant issue here is whether
skill-upgrading occurs via plant entry and exit, since this is more likely to cause
workers to move out of employment rather than up or down the skill ladder. Haskel
& Heden (1999, p.C70) ﬁnd that the exit and entry of new plants contributes between
34% and 45% of the increase in the proportion of skilled employment in the UK.
Estimates for the US from Dunne, Haltiwanger & Troske (1997, p.125) over the
period 1972–1987 ﬁnd that the entry and exit of plants contribute about 36% of
the increase in the proportion of non-production employment. By deﬁnition, the
remainder of skill upgrading occurs within or between existing plants. These plant-
level studies cannot tell us however whether within-plant skill upgrading occurs via
reallocation of existing labour or via laying oﬀ unskilled workers and taking on skilled
workers.
Bartel & Sicherman (1998) is closer in spirit to our analysis. Bartel & Sicherman
match industry-level measures of technological change to individual data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They show that in industries with
higher rates of technological change individuals are more likely to receive training.
It seems likely that the receipt of training and the probability of movement to higher
skill levels will be highly correlated.
The literature on the occupational mobility of individual workers has tended to
concentrate on the relationship between worker characteristics (such as human cap-
ital) and the probability of promotion. Two broad strands in this literature can
be identiﬁed. One, such as Sicherman & Galor (1990) considers how fully-informed
forward-looking agents choose an optimal career path which may involve movements
up or across occupational “ladders” in order to maximise lifetime income. A second
strand deﬁnes jobs as search or experience goods Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b), and as-
sumes some degree of imperfect information in the matching of workers with ﬁrms.
But generally the literature on the occupational mobility of workers takes the de-
mand side as given. The issue we wish to address in this paper is how changes in the
demand for diﬀerent skill groups aﬀects occupational mobility of individual workers.
3 Data construction
The data used are taken from waves 24–32 of the PSID and waves 1–10 of the
BHPS, covering the period 1991–2001 in both the US and the UK.1 In order to
1The PSID was not conducted in 1998 and 2000, and so these years are missing in the US data.
Detailed descriptions of the two datasets can be found in Hoﬀerth et al. (1998) and Taylor et al.
(2003).
4ensure maximum comparability between the two datasets, identical sample selection
and data construction methods were used.2
Both the PSID and BHPS samples comprised heads of households and their wives
taken from the core sample. The sample was restricted to heads and wives because
in the PSID many relevant questions are not asked of other household members.
Table 1 summarises the sample selection procedure.
Table 1: Sample selection
PSID BHPS
Individ. Person- Individ. Person-
years years
(a) All adult core sample members 20,990 129,438 15,344 124,702
(b) All heads and wives 18,550 105,832 12,152 77,136
(c) Full set of valid covariates 15,811 91,506 11,271 69,785
(d) In sample in consecutive years 14,056 72,738 9,457 55,610
88% (PSID) and 80% (BHPS) of adult sample members are either a head of house-
hold or a wife of a head. Between 15% (PSID) and 7% (BHPS) of the original
sample are lost because information on one of the covariates is missing. In order to
compute transitions between years we require individuals to appear in the data in
consecutive waves. All analysis that follows is therefore based on sample (d), which
comprises between 76% (PSID) and 78% (BHPS) of the total sample.
Deﬁnitions of skill groups
The deﬁnition of a “skill” will always be somewhat arbitrary. Practical limita-
tions have led many authors to distinguish only between “production” and “non-
production” workers, or possibly between “skilled” and “unskilled”. The empir-
ical literature on occupational mobility uses a number of other classiﬁcations to
2All data construction and estimation was conducted using Stata. All code is available from the
authors on request.
5determine whether a worker moves “up” or “down” an occupational ladder, in-
cluding within-ﬁrm grading (e.g. Wise 1975), esteem indicators (e.g. Mayhew &
Roswell 1981), average earnings (e.g. Nickell 1982) or some regression-weighted com-
bination of indicators (e.g. Sicherman & Galor 1990).
We take the view that an occupation is an important indicator of a worker’s skill
level. The 1988 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88)
(International Labour Oﬀice 1990) was developed partly to provide consistent in-
formation on occupations across countries. ISCO-88 deﬁnes a skill as “the degree
of complexity of constituent tasks” or alternatively “the ﬁeld of knowledge required
for competent performance of the constituent tasks”. Similarly, Elias, McKnight &
Kingshott (1999) argue that “skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed nec-
essary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated
with a job”, and this ordering is therefore based on the kinds of occupations which
can be competently performed by an individual with a certain level of education
(both in school and in work).
Recognising that only a few skill level categories can usefully be identiﬁed for cross-
national comparison, ISCO-88 provides four skill levels which are based on (a) the
level of general education required to perform a job and (b) the job-related formal
training required to perform a job.
Both the PSID and the BHPS record a three-digit occupational code for each em-
ployee. The BHPS provides the ISCO-88 occupation codes directly, while for the
PSID a concordance was developed by the authors.3 From this ISCO-88 code each
employee was categorised into one of four skill levels, deﬁned in Table 2.
How comparable are the occupations in each of these four skill groups across coun-
tries? Table 3 shows that the proportion of employees in each of the four skill groups
is similar across the two samples, although there are rather more workers in the PSID
in skill group 3, and rather more workers in the BHPS in skill group 4.
Although the shares of the four skill groups are similar across the two countries, this
does not conﬁrm whether those occupations in each skill group are similar. A simple
check of the consistency of these deﬁnitions is provided in Appendix A, where we
list in order of frequency the occupations in each skill group in both countries.
Finally, we should note that our primary objective in this paper does not rely heavily
on a consistent deﬁnition of “skill” across the two countries; it merely relies on a
consistent ranking within countries. It will however add considerable robustness to
3Available on request.
6Table 2: Deﬁnition of skill groups: ISCO-88 Skill-levels
ISCO Skill Level Description ISCO Major group
First skill level Competence associated with general
education usually acquired by comple-
tion of compulsory education.
(9) Elementary occupations
Second skill level Requires knowledge as for ﬁrst skill
level, but in addition typically have a
longer period of worker-related training
or work experience.
(4) Clerks; (5) Service workers
and shop and market sales work-
ers; (6) Skilled agriculture and ﬁsh-
ery workers; (7) Craft and related
workers; (8) Plant and machine op-
erators and assemblers
Third skill level Requires a body of knowledge associ-
ated with a period of post-compulsory
education but not to degree level.
(3) Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals
Fourth skill level Normally requires a degree or an equiv-
alent period of relevant work experi-
ence.
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials and
managers; (2) Professionals
Source: International Labour Oﬀice (1990, pp.2–3) and Elias et al. (1999).
Table 3: Shares of four skill
groups, PSID and BHPSa





a Proportion of employees in em-
ployment in each skill group.
our conclusions if we ﬁnd similar patterns across countries, and therefore we have
taken some care to make deﬁnitions as consistent as possible.
4 Movements up and down the skill ladder
In both surveys individuals are asked to describe their occupation every time they
are interviewed.4 Table 4 describes the patterns of movement between all four skill
groups, and non-employment, over the entire period for the two samples. Comparing
4The precise wording is similar in each survey. The PSID question is “What is your main
occupation? What sort of work do you do?” The BHPS asks “What was your (main) job last
week? Please tell me the exact job title and describe fully the sort of work you do.”
7the leading diagonal of these transition matrices gives an estimate of the probability
of not moving skill group between successive years. In three of the four skill groups
this estimate is higher for the BHPS than for the PSID, conﬁrming that the UK
experiences somewhat less mobility between skill groups. This diﬀerence is largest
for the bottom skill group. Transition rates out of this skill group are some 20%
higher in total in the PSID, although some of this diﬀerence is due to a higher rate
of transition out of employment.
Table 4: Transitions between skill groups
(a) PSID
Skill group at t
01234
0
a 0.871 0.016 0.069 0.021 0.023
Skill 1 0.164 0.529 0.258 0.025 0.025
group 2 0.117 0.044 0.730 0.048 0.061
at t − 1 3 0.106 0.010 0.117 0.656 0.111
4 0.085 0.007 0.091 0.068 0.749
(b) BHPS
Skill group at t
01234
0
a 0.937 0.009 0.036 0.006 0.011
Skill 1 0.144 0.622 0.208 0.012 0.013
group 2 0.096 0.026 0.787 0.039 0.053
at t − 1 3 0.073 0.007 0.127 0.655 0.138
4 0.069 0.003 0.081 0.056 0.791
a All non-employed, including unemployed, self-
employed and other Not In the Labour Force (NILF).
The ﬁrst column of each matrix gives an estimate of the transition rate out of
employment, into all non-employment categories grouped together. The ﬁrst row
gives an estimate of the transition rate into employment. As we would expect,
transition rates both into and out of employment are everywhere higher for the
PSID. In both samples the transition rate out of employment is declining in skill
level. But transition rates into employment are highest for the second skill group
rather than the ﬁrst.
Perhaps the most striking fact to emerge from Table 4 is the high rates of movement
both up and down skill levels. Over 25% of employees in the PSID in skill group 1
report being in skill group 2 a year later. The ﬁgure for the BHPS is just over 20%.
Of those in skill group 2, more than 10% (PSID) or 9% (BHPS) are in a higher skill
group a year later. Note that in both samples those being promoted from skill group
2 are actually more likely to move to skill group 4 than skill group 3.
8Demotion rates are also signiﬁcant in size. For example, of those in skill group 3,
13% (both samples) are in a lower skill group a year later. Of those in skill group 4,
14%–16% move down to a lower group.
These transition matrices are suﬃciently similar across countries to suggest that
we are measuring a similar phenomenon. We have conﬁrmed that employees in
the US are in general more mobile both between skill groups and into and out of
employment. Furthermore, despite the aggregate nature of these skill groups there
appears to be substantial movement of workers between them.
Measurement error
Clearly, there is a chance of measurement error occurring either during data col-
lection or coding. In particular, since we are trying to measure the movement of
workers between occupations, changes in the way the same occupation is described
by a respondent may induce changes in occupation codes without actual changes in
occupation. To some extent the problem is alleviated by our use of four aggregated
skill groups rather than more ﬁnely coded occupations. There are substantial dif-
ferences in the types of occupation in each skill group (see Appendix A), and so it
seems less likely that individuals will be misclassiﬁed.
To examine the likely extent of measurement error, in Table 5 we report the proba-
bility that a worker returns to the same skill group held 2 years earlier. Measurement
error at t will induce this kind of move.
Table 5: Returns to same skill level after 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skill Pr(Up) Pr(Down) Pr(Return|up) Pr(Return|down)
group Same ﬁrm New ﬁrm Same ﬁrm New ﬁrm
(a) PSID
1 0.368 — 0.205 0.109 — —
2 0.123 0.050 0.306 0.201 0.384 0.290
3 0.124 0.142 0.272 0.122 0.258 0.112
4 — 0.181 — — 0.298 0.169
All groups 0.111 0.097 0.273 0.159 0.308 0.189
(b) BHPS
1 0.273 — 0.204 0.090 — —
2 0.101 0.028 0.284 0.222 0.413 0.235
3 0.149 0.144 0.254 0.174 0.263 0.138
4 — 0.150 — — 0.338 0.186
All groups 0.091 0.076 0.262 0.173 0.331 0.188
9The ﬁrst two columns report the estimated probability of moving to a higher and
lower occupation.5 The remaining columns report the estimated probability of re-
turning to the same skill group, conditional on having moved up and down. It seems
likely that changes in occupation are more likely to be genuine when individuals also
report a change of employer. In both the PSID and the BHPS one can calculate
whether an individual changed employer over the preceding 12 months.6 We there-
fore split the probability of return between those who changed employer and those
who remained at the same ﬁrm.
Of those workers who reported a movement to a higher skill group but no change
of employer (column 3), 27% return to the same skill group a year later in the
PSID, and 26% in the BHPS. This rate is about three times greater than the rate
of demotion in the sample as a whole (column 2), strongly suggesting the existence
of measurement error. The rate of downgrading of those who reported promotion
in the previous period and changed ﬁrm is 16% in the PSID and 17% in the BHPS,
some 1.6–2.3 times greater than the rate of promotion in the sample as a whole.
A similar pattern emerges for workers who report returning to the same skill group
following a demotion in the previous year (columns 5 and 6). Of those who do
not change employer, 31% (PSID) and 33% (BHPS) return to the same skill group.
Again, this rate is about three times greater than the rate of promotion for the
sample as a whole.
Wage eﬀects of occupational mobility
Table 5 probably provides an upper bound on the extent of measurement error, since
many ofthetransitionswillinfactbegenuine.Nevertheless,somenoiseislikelyto
be present in our data. It is therefore important to determine whether reported
occupational mobility has an eﬀect on other quantiﬁable labour market outcomes,
such as wages. In Table 6 we report average hourly wages split by the movement of
workers over the preceding 12 months. These results provide strong evidence that we
are picking up a genuine phenomenon in Table 4, despite some measurement error.
Workers who move down between skill groups suﬀer wage losses of 19%–25% in the
PSID and 19%–24% in the BHPS, compared to workers who remain in the same
skill group. The size of the loss is very similar across countries and in both cases
5These estimates are not the same as those reported in Table 4 because here we exclude com-
pletely movements into and out of employment. The denominator is therefore smaller and estimates
of movement probabilities higher.
6In the PSID individuals are asked for the date when they started working for their present
employer. In the BHPS individuals are asked whether they held any jobs in the previous 12 months
with a diﬀerent employer.
10increases with skill level. Workers who move up between skill groups gain 9%–21%
in the PSID and 11%–24% in the BHPS compared to workers who remain in the
same skill group.
Table 6: Raw wage eﬀects of occupational movement
(a) PSID
Wage level $ Wage change %
Skill-group Down Same Up Downgrading Upgrading
Penalty Bonus
1 — 8.73 9.91 — 13.52%
2 9.34 11.49 12.57 -18.71% 9.40%
3 11.20 14.48 17.46 -22.65% 20.58%
4 15.20 20.17 — -24.64% —
(b) BHPS
Wage level £ Wage change %
Skill-group Down Same Up Downgrading Upgrading
Penalty Bonus
1 — 4.84 5.37 — 10.95%
2 5.10 6.26 7.74 -18.53% 23.64%
3 7.20 8.91 10.45 -19.19% 17.28%
4 8.95 11.84 — -24.41% —
Theseresultsestablishthat,despitethepossibility    of    measurementerror,the
processofoccupationalmobilityhaslargemeasurableeﬀectsonwages.Second,they
establish that this process is very similar in both countries.
To investigate the wage eﬀect further, we estimate the impact of mobility on wages
conditional on a basic set of individual characteristics. The model estimated is:
lnwit = β0 + β1Uitsi,t−1 + β2Ditsi,t−1 + β3si,t−1 + β4xit + εit. (1)
The dummy variables Uit and Dit are deﬁned as Uit =1 ( sit >s i,t−1) (promotion)
and Dit =1 ( sit <s i,t−1) (demotion). We estimate the relationship separately for
each skill group at t−1 si,t−1 by interacting these dummies with a vector of dummies






i,t−1 =1 ( si,t−1 = 1). We also include the set of dummies si,t−1 directly in
the regression, as well as xit a basic set of individual characteristics measuring age,
gender and education. The vectors of coeﬃcients β1 and β2 can be interpreted as
the approximate percentage change in wages for an individual in each skill group
who is promoted or demoted between t − 1a n dt.
In Table 7 we report estimates of Equation (1). We estimate (1) separately for
within- and between-ﬁrm moves to see whether the greater possibility of measure-
11ment error observed for within-ﬁrm moves aﬀects the signiﬁcance of the wage eﬀect
of occupational movements.
The results are robust to the inclusion of worker characteristics, and are all highly
signiﬁcant with the exception of between-ﬁrm upgrades in the BHPS. Workers who
change to a lower skill group and change employer suﬀer particularly large wage
losses of between 19%–40% in the PSID and 15%–36% in the BHPS. As in the raw
data, the extent of wage loss is increasing with skill group. In contrast, workers who
move up skill groups and change employer do not necessarily gain more than those
who are promoted within ﬁrms.
Table 7: Conditional wage eﬀects of occupational
movement
Within-ﬁrm moves




Down (skill group 2) −0.160 (0.017) −0.145 (0.022)
Down (skill group 3) −0.133 (0.020) −0.133 (0.022)
Down (skill group 4) −0.120 (0.015) −0.205 (0.018)
Up (skill group 1) 0.120 (0.019) 0.085 (0.024)
Up (skill group 2) 0.100 (0.012) 0.182 (0.013)
Up (skill group 3) 0.101 (0.021) 0.114 (0.024)
Between-ﬁrm moves
(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Down (skill group 2) −0.188 (0.024) −0.146 (0.038)
Down (skill group 3) −0.344 (0.034) −0.314 (0.048)
Down (skill group 4) −0.406 (0.032) −0.360 (0.039)
Up (skill group 1) 0.099 (0.033) 0.070 (0.053)
Up (skill group 2) 0.136 (0.021) 0.178 (0.031)
Up (skill group 3) 0.082 (0.042) 0.065 (0.053)
a Log wages regressed on age, gender and a set of education
dummies, together with dummies indicating movement
between skill groups.
b Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7 therefore provides more evidence that the movements we observe between
skillgroupshaverealconsequenceson   wages, eventhoughtheymay    becon-
taminated by measurement error. Indeed, we might expect that measurement error
would attenuate these eﬀects, suggesting the movement between skill groups has
even larger impacts on wages than those reported here. It also appears that demo-
tion between ﬁrms has particularly large negative eﬀects on wages, while promotion
within and between ﬁrms has approximately the same positive impact on wages.
125 Skill intensity and skill upgrading
We have now established the extent of occupational mobility in each country and
also the fact that mobility has large eﬀects on wages. In this section we aggregate
up measures of skill across industries to compare patterns of skill intensity and
skill upgrading across the US and UK. We do this in order to construct the key
explanatory variable of the model, which is the speed with which industries have
increased their skill intensity over the sample period.
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Figure 1: Average skill intensity by industry, PSID and BHPS
An initial crude measure of “skill intensity” is to take the arithmetic mean of the
skill index sit =1 ,2,3,4 for each industry over the sample period. In Figure 1 we
plot this measure for each country for 18 industries.7 Using this simple measure it
is clear that industries in the UK and US have generally similar skill intensity, with
the obvious outlier of agriculture.
In Figure 2 we plot the proportion of employment in each skill group sit separately
by industry. This reveals more clearly discrepancies between occupational deﬁnitions
in the two countries, although the correlation is still high.
As noted, the key explanatory variable in our model is the speed with which in-
7Our choice of industry is determined by the available sample size of the micro-data. Industries
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Skill group 4, correlation=0.62
Figure 2: Proportion of employment by skill group, PSID and BHPS
dustries have upgraded the skill intensity of their workforce. In Figure 3 we plot
the annual average change in the proportion of employment in each skill group by
industry. It is clear that although the levels of skill intensity are quite similar across
countries, there is more variation in the speed with which industries have changed
their skill intensity.8 One can see that the majority of industries in both countries
have reduced the proportion of workers in skill group 1 (top left hand quadrant),
and increased the proportion in skill group 4 (bottom right). But changes in the
proportion of workers in the middle two skill groups are more varied.
However, the fact that industries have increased their skill intensities at diﬀerent
rates between the US and UK provides an additional variability in the data with
which to check the robustness of our results. If the speed of skill upgrading has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of promotion or demotion, and that eﬀect is
coming from diﬀerent industries in each country we can be conﬁdent that it is not
the result of some industry speciﬁc eﬀect.
8Thecorrelationcoeﬃcientbetweenthetwocountriesisofthesameorderofmagnitudeas
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Skill group 4, correlation=0.52
Figure 3: Change in proportion of employment by skill group, PSID and BHPS
6 The relationship between skill upgrading and occupa-
tional mobility
In this section we investigate whether the speed of skill upgrading has had any
inﬂuence on patterns of occupational mobility. We have two speciﬁc objectives:
1. Does the speed of skill upgrading in an industry lead to greater upward mobility
of workers, or does it lead to a greater rate of job loss and downward mobility?
2. Is the speed of skill upgrading in an industry a quantitatively important com-
ponent of occupational mobility, or is it relatively unimportant compared to
the inﬂuence of individual worker characteristics?
The three basic models we estimate are binary Probit models which relate the prob-
ability of promotion, demotion and exit to a set of industry-level measures of skill
upgrading.9
9It might be thought appropriate to model the movement between skill groups as a single multi-
nomial response. In fact, estimating models (2) to (4) as a 4-way Multinomial Logit makes little
diﬀerence to our results. The results of this exercise are reported in Appendix B.

































Equation (2) is the probability of moving up the skill ladder. It is estimated sepa-
rately for each skill group s at t−1, and is a function of the change in the proportion








Note that the explanatory variables are in proportions and so
4
s=1 ∆Ps
jt =0 .W e
therefore have to exclude one of the skill groups in each of the regressions. In ad-
dition, we include a vector of worker characteristics (measured at t − 1), xi,t−1 to
capture other inﬂuences on the probability of promotion. If observably “better”
workers select into industries with faster rates of skill upgrading, the correlation
between career mobility and industry upgrading rates might be spurious. The em-
pirical literature on occupational mobility provides us with some guidance as to what
xi,t−1 should contain. Sicherman & Galor (1990), for example, derive and estimate
a model in which the level of schooling, experience and duration in occupation are
important inﬂuences. Our basic speciﬁcation includes age, tenure with current em-
ployer and years of education, as well as gender, marital status, union status, health
and current hourly wage. Table 8 provides summary statistics for all explanatory
variables.
The most noticeable diﬀerence between the two samples is in the distribution of years
of education; the BHPS sample has a much higher proportion with less than 12 years
of education. The BHPS sample is also slightly older and has rather fewer children.
Note also that it is not possible to determine the length of time an individual has
been working for their current employer in the BHPS if they started working for
them before the start of the panel in 1991. We therefore use length of time in
current position as a proxy.
We also include a full set of industry dummies Ij. This means that we are identifying
the eﬀect of skill upgrading on the probability of promotion via within-industry
16Table 8: Explanatory variables: descriptive statistics
(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
∆P
1 −0.0024 0.0156 −0.0014 0.0234
∆P
2 −0.0022 0.0272 −0.0003 0.0395
∆P
3 0.0007 0.0188 −0.0003 0.0254
∆P
4 0.0039 0.0234 0.0020 0.0355
Age 44.24 15.62 48.48 17.20
Female 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50
12 years of education 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.42
13–15 years of education 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
≥ 16 years of education 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
Married 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48
Number of children 0.76 1.07 0.60 0.99
Health limits work 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40
Tenure with present employer 7.67 7.75 4.80
a 6.00
Represented by union 0.20 0.40 0.44 0.50
Union member 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.46
Hourly wage $13.34 $16.41 £7.88 £5.20
a Tenure in current position with present employer.
changes in ∆Ps
jt. It may be that some industries have a higher propensity both for
skill upgrading and for occupational mobility, although the two are not necessarily
correlated.
Equation (3) is the probability of moving down the skill ladder, and is speciﬁed in
exactly the same way as (2). Equation (4) is the probability of exiting employment
between t − 1a n dt. This is deﬁned as having a skill group of 0 at t conditional on
having a positive skill group at t − 1.10
In each model the parameters of particular interest are βs, the estimated impact
of changes in the size of skill groups on movement probabilities. A change in the
relative size of a skill group can be accommodated by a change in the relative rates
of promotion, demotion or entry and exit. Models (2)–(4) allow us to quantify the
relative importance of each of these routes, while controlling for individual charac-
teristics and skill levels.
In Table 9 we report the marginal eﬀects associated with the estimates of βup from
model (2). The ﬁrst panel shows the “raw” eﬀect i.e.the estimates of model (2) with
xi,t−1 and Ij excluded. The second panel gives results with the Ij included, and the
third panel with both xi,t−1 and Ij included. We report marginal eﬀects because
10Skill group “0” comprises all labour market states apart from employment, including unem-
ployment, self-employment, retirement, ill-health and education. In the PSID the most common
exit state from employment is unemployment; in the BHPS rather more exit into retirement and
ill-health.
17these are non-linear probability models.
Table 9: Estimates of probability of promotiona
(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Skill group at t − 1 Skill group at t − 1




jt −0.5761 −0.1004 0.0402 0.4827
[0.001] [0.781] [0.742] [0.338]
∆P
2
jt 2.0038 −0.0530 0.7843 −0.1860
[0.000] [0.829] [0.019] [0.358]
∆P
3
jt 1.8944 0.4708 0.5452 0.2832
[0.007] [0.001] [0.262] [0.028]
∆P
4
jt 2.2132 0.3105 0.8099 0.4462 0.1823 0.2271




jt −0.3737 0.0684 −0.0674 0.2323
[0.023] [0.821] [0.610] [0.593]
∆P
2
jt 2.1006 0.0735 0.7799 0.1108
[0.000] [0.730] [0.024] [0.581]
∆P
3
jt 2.3593 0.5112 0.4588 0.2701
[0.001] [0.000] [0.377] [0.019]
∆P
4
jt 2.5035 0.2991 0.7011 0.5022 0.1375 0.5522




jt −0.3706 0.0360 −0.0357 0.2780
[0.018] [0.901] [0.775] [0.512]
∆P
2
jt 1.9909 0.1024 0.7043 0.0983
[0.000] [0.618] [0.049] [0.613]
∆P
3
jt 2.3027 0.5102 0.4246 0.2563
[0.002] [0.000] [0.417] [0.020]
∆P
4
jt 2.3538 0.2729 0.6969 0.3930 0.1384 0.6089
[0.000] [0.008] [0.002] [0.337] [0.074] [0.002]
a Robust p-values in brackets.
The ﬁrst point to note is that estimates of βup appear robust to the inclusion of
industry ﬁxed eﬀects and individual covariates. This suggests that the correlation
between the speed of skill upgrading and the probability of promotion is not being
caused either by a correlation with industry ﬁxed eﬀects or a correlation with the
individual characteristics of workers in those industries.
We therefore focus on the third panel of Table 9. We ﬁnd that a higher rate of
increase in the proportion of employment in higher skill groups signiﬁcantly increases
the probability that an individual is promoted. In other words, an individual working
in industry j in skill group s is more likely to be promoted if industry j is expanding
its employment of workers in skill groups above s. This result is conﬁrmed both in
the PSID and the BHPS, although the estimated marginal eﬀects for the PSID are
18in every case larger and more signiﬁcant (a smaller p-value).
We should stress that this result is not occurring simply because the explanatory
variables (the changes in the shares of each skill group in each industry) are created
from aggregating up the individual-level data. As we noted in the introduction,
changes in ∆Ps
jt can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, industries
might expand the proportional size of skill group s by hiring more workers from the
same skill group in other industries; by hiring more workers from non-employment
(such as from education), or by promoting more workers from lower skill groups.
Furthermore, the proportional size of a skill group can also be increased by reduc-
ing outﬂows rather than increasing inﬂows. There are therefore several degrees of
freedom in the relationship between the probability of promotion and the change in
the proportional size of each skill group.
How large are these eﬀects? The marginal eﬀects reported refer to the slope of the
estimated probability of promotion evaluated at the mean of ∆Ps
jt. To determine
the size of these eﬀects one needs to consider how much the probability of promotion
would change for a realistic change in ∆Ps
jt. We therefore scale the marginal eﬀects
by the inter-quartile range of each explanatory variable. This gives us an estimate
of how much the probability of promotion changes between an individual working
in an industry with a slow rate of change and one with a fast rate of change. These
scaled estimates are given in Table 10.










10 .368 0.0553 0.0541 0.0707
20 .123 0.0120 0.0082
30 .124 0.0209
(b) BHPS
10 .273 0.0319 —
a —
a
20 .101 0.0057 0.0052
30 .149 0.0229
a Insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at 10%.
The baseline probability of promotion from skill group 1 is 0.368 (PSID) and 0.273
(BHPS). Working in an industry with a rate of skill upgrading at the top of the
inter-quartile range rather than the bottom increases the probability of promotion
by about 5.5 percentage points in the PSID and 3.2 in the BHPS. The eﬀect is
generally smaller for higher skill groups in absolute terms, but is still large in relative
19terms. The baseline probability of promotion from skill group 3 is 0.124 (PSID) and
0.149 (BHPS). This is increased by 0.0209 (PSID) and 0.0229 (BHPS), a substantial
relative change.
Table 11: Estimates of probability of demotion
(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Skill group at t − 1 Skill group at t − 1




jt 0.2397 0.4772 0.0604 0.2387 0.9217 0.6444
[0.031] [0.202] [0.824] [0.003] [0.027] [0.015]
∆P
2
jt 1.0203 0.2173 0.4789 0.5561
[0.000] [0.221] [0.011] [0.000]
∆P
3
jt −0.1563 0.1699 0.0159 0.2964
[0.067] [0.475] [0.817] [0.153]
∆P
4
jt −0.0679 0.0677 −0.0146 0.1063




jt 0.2268 0.4790 0.2399 0.1742 0.5222 0.4951
[0.013] [0.144] [0.355] [0.002] [0.194] [0.035]
∆P
2
jt 0.9530 0.1838 0.5565 0.4583
[0.000] [0.287] [0.004] [0.001]
∆P
3
jt −0.0751 0.3663 0.0072 0.2799
[0.441] [0.106] [0.920] [0.117]
∆P
4
jt −0.0183 0.0994 −0.0089 0.3017




jt 0.2092 0.3814 0.1653 0.1395 0.3667 0.6017
[0.011] [0.196] [0.515] [0.003] [0.313] [0.008]
∆P
2
jt 0.8420 0.0788 0.4721 0.4658
[0.000] [0.643] [0.006] [0.000]
∆P
3
jt −0.0864 0.2801 0.0117 0.2950
[0.323] [0.207] [0.844] [0.095]
∆P
4
jt −0.0197 0.1215 −0.0112 0.2516
[0.752] [0.590] [0.760] [0.139]
In Table 11 we report the marginal eﬀects of estimates of βdown from Equation (3).
As before, those estimates which are signiﬁcantly from zero appear quite robust
to the inclusion of industry ﬁxed eﬀects (second column) and individual covariates
(third column). Interestingly, we also ﬁnd evidence of a “pull” eﬀect from changes
in the proportions of skill groups, but this time in a downward direction. A worker
in skill group s working in an industry which expands the size of skill group s−1i s
signiﬁcantly more likely to be demoted. In the PSID this is true for workers in skill
groups 2 and 3, but not in the top skill group. In the BHPS this is true for all skill
groups.
20However, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that skill upgrading per se increases the rate of
individual demotion. As noted in the introduction, if the process of skill upgrading
leads to lower skill jobs being destroyed, workers who held those jobs might be forced
further down the skill ladder if they are unable to retrain. Empirically, this would
mean that a worker at skill level s would be more likely to be demoted if their
industry was experiencing a higher rate of growth of skill groups s +1 ,s+ 2 and so
on. The results in Table 11 show that this eﬀect is always insigniﬁcant and in some
cases wrongly signed.


















a Insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
10%.
As before, these results need to be scaled by some range within the data to get
an idea how large the eﬀect is, shown in Table 12. Although the absolute size of
the eﬀect is generally smaller than the promotion eﬀect, relative to the baseline
probability the eﬀect can be quite large. An average worker in skill level 3 has a
baseline probability of demotion of 0.142 (PSID) and 0.144 (BHPS). In both samples
this probability is 0.02 greater in industries with high rates of growth of skill group
2. These results do not support the hypothesis that industry-level skill upgrading
causes higher rates of individual demotion. Nevertheless, they do reveal that worker
mobility does respond signiﬁcantly to changes in employment proportions, both in
an upward and a downward direction.
Given the strong relationship between skill upgrading and worker promotion and
demotion, it seems less likely that changes in the sizes of skill groups will have
a large eﬀect on the rate at which workers leave employment. This is conﬁrmed
by the results in Table 13, which report marginal eﬀects of estimates of βout from
Equation (4). In both countries we can ﬁnd few signiﬁcant relationships between
21any of the explanatory variables and the rate of exit.11 This implies that a worker
in skill group s does not suﬀer a greater likelihood of exiting employment if their
industry has a higher rate of growth of skill groups s +1 ,s +2a n ds oo n .
Table 13: Estimates of probability of exiting employmenta
(a) PSID (b) BHPS





jt −0.0933 0.3418 −0.0487 −0.0380 0.0399 0.0148 −0.0294
[0.523] [0.197] [0.772] [0.870] [0.716] [0.959] [0.850]
∆P
2
jt 0.3050 0.1208 0.1721 0.2242 0.2366 0.0654
[0.328] [0.532] [0.125] [0.546] [0.088] [0.479]
∆P
3
jt 0.9293 0.0372 0.0573 0.1381 0.1801 0.1947
[0.049] [0.774] [0.698] [0.591] [0.127] [0.131]
∆P
4
jt 0.5964 0.0888 0.1026 0.1502 0.1516
[0.113] [0.341] [0.607] [0.039] [0.284]
a These estimates refer to the combined probability of exiting employment to any non-
employment labour market state; including unemployment, retirement and self-employment.
Returning to the ﬁrst question posed at the beginning of this section, these results
suggest that the speed of skill upgrading does indeed contribute to a greater upward
mobility of workers rather than increased rates of demotion or job loss.
Within- and between-ﬁrm mobility
Our conclusion that ﬁrms increase the proportion of more highly skilled workers
by taking on more workers from lower skill groups (and hence increasing the rate
of promotion) would be strengthened if we could show that this process occurred
predominantly within rather than between ﬁrms.
In Table 14 we report estimates of the probability of promotion separately for those
workers who stay in the same ﬁrm and those workers who change ﬁrm. All these
estimates include a full set of covariates and industry dummies, and therefore can
be compared to the third panel of Tables 9.
The results are generally supportive of the hypothesis that the eﬀect of skill upgrad-
ing on the probability of promotion comes through within ﬁrm moves. In the PSID
sample all of the signiﬁcant eﬀects reported in Table 9 are also signiﬁcant for within
ﬁrmmoves,andallbuttwo areinsigniﬁcantforbetweenﬁrmmoves.Notealsothat
11In the Multinomial Logit estimates reported in Appendix B we ﬁnd some evidence that skill
upgrading does cause an increased probability of exiting employment, particularly for the bottom
skill group in the PSID. However, the size of the marginal eﬀects are far smaller than those on the
probability of promotion, and so our conclusion still holds.
22Table 14: Estimates of probability of promotion: within and be-
tween ﬁrms
(a) PSID (b) BHPS





jt −0.1699 0.0999 0.0182 0.3173
[0.215] [0.693] [0.874] [0.420]
∆P
2
jt 1.6327 0.0386 0.1156 0.1569
[0.000] [0.828] [0.719] [0.391]
∆P
3
jt 2.1964 0.2906 0.2135 0.2461
[0.001] [0.010] [0.645] [0.012]
∆P
4
jt 2.0337 0.1858 0.5507 −0.1101 0.1768 0.5938




jt −0.1398 −0.0547 −0.0384 −0.0270
[0.013] [0.579] [0.317] [0.758]
∆P
2
jt 0.2309 0.0558 0.3400 −0.0385
[0.301] [0.475] [0.018] [0.342]
∆P
3
jt 0.0703 0.1505 −0.0355 0.0052
[0.840] [0.001] [0.888] [0.893]
∆P
4
jt 0.2280 0.0432 0.0585 0.2857 −0.0270 0.0012
[0.388] [0.238] [0.494] [0.098] [0.284] [0.977]
the size of the marginal eﬀects are in every case larger for within than between ﬁrm
moves.
In the BHPS sample we get precisely the same result for skill groups 2 and 3: within
ﬁrm moves are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by skill upgrading while between ﬁrm moves are
not. The only exception is in skill group 1, where the overall eﬀect seems to come
through more strongly from between than within ﬁrm moves.
Individual characteristics and industry demand
Thus far we have concentrated solely on the impact of changing employment shares
on the probability of moves up and down the skill ladder. But how important
are these inﬂuences relative to the personal and workplace characteristics of the
individuals concerned?
(a) Promotion
Table 15 reports the marginal eﬀects of estimates of γup for Model (2), the prob-
ability of promotion. The results indicate considerable consistency in eﬀect across
23countries. In no cases do we ﬁnd a sign disagreement where the coeﬃcient estimate
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent zero at the 10% level in both countries. This indicates that
similar processes underly the promotion process in both countries, and gives us some
conﬁdence in the robustness of our results.
Table 15: Marginal eﬀects of worker characteristics on probability of promotion
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3
(a) PSID
Age −0.0044 [0.478] 0.0020 [0.256] 0.0016 [0.618]
Age
2 × 100 −0.0010 [0.890] −0.0048 [0.032] −0.0031 [0.422]
Female −0.0293 [0.229] 0.0357 [0.000] −0.0274 [0.011]
12 years of education 0.0155 [0.538] 0.0504 [0.000] 0.0316 [0.220]
13–15 years of education 0.1174 [0.001] 0.1148 [0.000] 0.0610 [0.022]
≥ 16 years of education 0.1720 [0.017] 0.2539 [0.000] 0.1279 [0.000]
Married 0.0013 [0.955] 0.0138 [0.015] 0.0218 [0.019]
Number of children −0.0138 [0.229] −0.0040 [0.144] −0.0148 [0.001]
Health limits work −0.0518 [0.147] 0.0102 [0.296] −0.0114 [0.434]
Tenure with current employer −0.0154 [0.000] −0.0031 [0.002] −0.0033 [0.067]
Tenure
2 × 100 0.0548 [0.000] 0.0136 [0.000] 0.0109 [0.106]
Represented by union −0.1061 [0.039] −0.0280 [0.046] 0.0027 [0.915]
Union member −0.0388 [0.487] −0.0388 [0.009] −0.0167 [0.522]
Hourly wage 0.0117 [0.001] 0.0006 [0.070] 0.0003 [0.228]
(b) BHPS
Age 0.0017 [0.814] −0.0020 [0.318] 0.0096 [0.065]
Age
2 × 100 −0.0100 [0.212] 0.0019 [0.448] −0.0134 [0.038]
Female −0.0751 [0.015] −0.0024 [0.761] −0.0546 [0.001]
12 years of education −0.0389 [0.264] 0.0340 [0.000] 0.0022 [0.939]
13–15 years of education 0.0510 [0.240] 0.0705 [0.000] 0.0139 [0.624]
≥ 16 years of education −0.0205 [0.723] 0.1267 [0.000] 0.0246 [0.385]
Married −0.0327 [0.302] −0.0070 [0.318] −0.0072 [0.654]
Number of children −0.0011 [0.944] −0.0092 [0.006] −0.0141 [0.087]
Health limits work −0.0375 [0.379] −0.0074 [0.449] −0.0264 [0.288]
Tenure with current employer −0.0042 [0.349] −0.0056 [0.000] −0.0105 [0.001]
Tenure
2 × 100 0.0044 [0.756] 0.0149 [0.001] 0.0244 [0.079]
Represented by union 0.0455 [0.251] 0.0036 [0.656] 0.0347 [0.084]
Union member −0.0403 [0.356] −0.0254 [0.004] −0.0320 [0.118]
Hourly wage 0.0068 [0.320] 0.0099 [0.000] 0.0043 [0.004]
In the US, education has a monotonically increasing impact on the probability of
promotion for all skill groups. Workers with 13–15 years of education are 11–12%
more likely of being promoted from skill groups 1 and 2, and 6% more likely of being
promoted from skill group 3, than someone with less than 12 years of education.
Those with university degrees or equivalent face an even more favourable situation,
with promotion probabilities 13–25% higher than those with base level qualiﬁcations.
In the UK the pattern is less pronounced, with the positive impact of education being
24restricted to those in skill group 2. Qualitatively the impact is also smaller, with
those having university level qualiﬁcations facing promotion prospects 13% higher
than the base group.
Personal characteristics also prove to be important in determining the probability
of promotion. In general women face worse promotion prospects than men, being
less likely to be promoted into the top skill group and out of the bottom skill group
in both countries. An exception to this occurs in skill group 2 in the US, where
women’s promotion prospects appear to be more favourable.
Family circumstances also prove to be an important determinant of promotion
prospects in both countries. The number of children always attracts a negative
coeﬃcient, although this appears only to be statistically signiﬁcant when promo-
tions from higher skill categories are considered. In contrast marriage proves to be
beneﬁcial to employment prospects in the US, though no similar eﬀect is observable
for the UK.
Other personal characteristics prove to be relatively unimportant. Within skill
groups, the age of the individual has no statistically signiﬁcant impact and, although
the impact of health problems on promotion prospects is everywhere negative, it is
never statistically signiﬁcant.
If we now consider diﬀering aspects of workplace organisation, there is evidence that
union organisation has a negative impacts on the probability of promotion. In both
countries union members are less likely to be promoted from skill group 2 and in
the US union presence inhibits promotion from skill groups 1 and 2. The direction
of causality might be questioned for these variables however if those with lower
promotion prospects join the union for employment protection reasons.
We ﬁnd that workers with higher levels of tenure are less likely to be promoted
in both countries. At ﬁrst glance this appears surprising, because it suggests that
someone is most likely to be promoted immediately on joining a ﬁrm. Although the
tenure eﬀect becomes positive again after 11–14 years in PSID, no turning point
is apparent in the BHPS results. To investigate this eﬀect further we compared
the impact of tenure on within and between ﬁrm movements. As expected, for
within ﬁrm movement the tenure variable attracts a positive coeﬃcient, so promotion
becomes more likely over time. The overall negative impact reﬂects the general eﬀect
of matching which slows all moves including promotion. In our data this latter eﬀect
dominates.
Finally those individuals with higher hourly wages are more likely to be promoted.
Within skill group, a higher wage is likely to reﬂect both a high ﬁrm worker match
25and higher unobserved worker quality. This is statistically signiﬁcant for skill groups
1 and 2 in the US and 2 and 3 in the UK.
(b) Demotion
Table 16 presents analogous results to Table 15, but for the probability of demotion.
Once again there is a strong consistency in our ﬁndings across countries. In both the
US and the UK the importance of educational background on employment prospects
is apparent. Higher levels of education reduce the likelihood of demotion. Quanti-
tatively the impact of education on demotion is however somewhat smaller than its
impact on promotion. Educational qualiﬁcations higher than the base reduce the
probability of demotion by between 0.7 and 2.3% for skill group 1 in the US and
between 1-2% for the UK. For higher skill groups the eﬀect is quantitatively larger,
though the eﬀect only shows through for those with the higher levels of education
in skill groups 3 and 4. This may however simply reﬂect the low number of individ-
uals in these categories with low educational levels, which make the eﬀect hard to
determine statistically.
The impact of gender on the probability of demotion is rather more complicated
than that for promotion. In the UK, those women in higher skill levels are more
likely to be demoted than males but less likely to be demoted from skill group 1. In
the US women fair comparatively better, being less likely to be demoted from skill
groups 1 and 2.
In general, those family circumstances which made an individual less likely to be
promoted also make the individual more likely to be demoted. Marriage improves
employment prospects, whereas having more children make an individual more likely
to face an adverse downward movement, though these eﬀects are limited to the lower
skill groups. In skill group 4, family circumstances are statistically insigniﬁcant in
both countries.
As with the promotion probabilities, tenure appears to reﬂect the increasing average
quality of match. Hence those with high levels of tenure are less likely be demoted.
This eﬀect may also be reﬂected in the negative coeﬃcient associated with age in
the PSID sample. In contrast, higher hourly wages, which reﬂect both better match
quality and higher levels of unobserved worker quality, are associated with a lower
likelihood of demotion.
What is perhaps most striking about the results from Tables 15 and 16 is that the
marginal eﬀects associated with individual characteristics are not in general much
26Table 16: Marginal eﬀects of worker characteristics on probability of demotion
Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4
(a) PSID
Age 0.0006 [0.522] −0.0067 [0.038] −0.0058 [0.082]
Age
2 × 100 −0.0005 [0.630] 0.0067 [0.095] 0.0069 [0.077]
Female −0.0365 [0.000] −0.0241 [0.044] 0.0143 [0.200]
12 years of education −0.0068 [0.096] 0.0081 [0.681] −0.0341 [0.178]
13–15 years of education −0.0214 [0.000] −0.0187 [0.349] −0.0777 [0.001]
≥ 16 years of education −0.0234 [0.000] −0.0776 [0.000] −0.2115 [0.000]
Married −0.0133 [0.000] −0.0147 [0.137] −0.0148 [0.171]
Number of children −0.0006 [0.692] 0.0099 [0.026] −0.0041 [0.366]
Health limits work −0.0104 [0.042] −0.0002 [0.990] 0.0011 [0.947]
Tenure with current employer −0.0019 [0.001] −0.0020 [0.222] −0.0028 [0.094]
Tenure
2 × 100 0.0052 [0.006] 0.0088 [0.141] 0.0073 [0.219]
Represented by union 0.0072 [0.383] 0.0068 [0.801] 0.0141 [0.621]
Union member 0.0099 [0.264] 0.0285 [0.361] −0.0018 [0.952]
Hourly wage −0.0036 [0.000] −0.0070 [0.000] −0.0029 [0.042]
(b) BHPS
Age −0.0008 [0.423] 0.0015 [0.749] −0.0033 [0.409]
Age
2 × 100 0.0008 [0.499] −0.0012 [0.840] 0.0030 [0.544]
Female −0.0081 [0.027] 0.0352 [0.019] 0.0319 [0.006]
12 years of education −0.0119 [0.001] −0.0219 [0.332] −0.0176 [0.353]
13–15 years of education −0.0195 [0.000] −0.0268 [0.230] −0.0429 [0.021]
≥ 16 years of education −0.0109 [0.008] −0.0880 [0.000] −0.0980 [0.000]
Married −0.0093 [0.011] −0.0372 [0.012] 0.0174 [0.124]
Number of children 0.0051 [0.001] 0.0214 [0.004] 0.0019 [0.724]
Health limits work −0.0092 [0.043] 0.0152 [0.523] 0.0129 [0.568]
Tenure with current employer −0.0010 [0.079] −0.0009 [0.732] −0.0023 [0.252]
Tenure
2 × 100 0.0033 [0.095] −0.0051 [0.678] 0.0044 [0.622]
Represented by union 0.0114 [0.004] 0.0351 [0.045] 0.0143 [0.314]
Union member −0.0032 [0.457] −0.0196 [0.285] −0.0126 [0.393]
Hourly wage −0.0046 [0.000] −0.0136 [0.000] −0.0091 [0.000]
larger than those associated with the changes in industry measures of skill upgrading
reported earlier, with the exception of time in education. This conﬁrms that skill
upgrading may be a quantitatively important component of occupational mobility.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have used comparable individual level panel datasets for the US
and UK to examine how industry level shifts in the demand for diﬀerent types of
workers has impacted on the occupational mobility of individual workers. Both
countries have experienced substantial skill upgrading over the period considered,
reducing the proportion in elementary occupations and increasing the proportion
in technical, associate professional and professional grades. However the extent of
upgrading across industries has diﬀered in its level and in its timing. Thus, the use
27of parallel datasets has allowed us to explore the robustness of our results across
separate labour markets facing diﬀerent patterns of upgrading.
For both countries we ﬁnd very high rates of movement up occupational ladders with,
for example, between 20% and 25% of workers moving from skill level 1 to skill level
2 within a year. However, perhaps more surprisingly, we ﬁnd that demotion rates
are also large. Despite the presence of some measurement error, we ﬁnd convincing
evidence to suggest that such measured ﬂows reﬂect genuine phenomena however.
Demotions are associated with wages losses of between 18%–25% in the US and
17%–22% in the UK, with those moving employer suﬀering additional falls. Workers
who move up skill ladders, by contrast, gain to the tune of 9%–21% in the US and
8%–21% in the UK.
We then examine the link between skill upgrading and the occupational mobility. In
particular we assess whether the changing aggregate structure of the labour market
encourages upward occupational mobility or whether it causes career interruption
and dislocation. We ﬁnd strong evidence to support the former view. An increase in
the proportion of workers in higher skill groups signiﬁcantly increases the probability
that an individual will be promoted. This eﬀect is also quantitatively large. A worker
facing a rate of upgrading at the 75th percentile is 5% more likely to be promoted
that an equivalent worker at the 25th percentile in the US, and 3.5% more likely in
the UK. By contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence that skill upgrading increases the rate of
individual demotion or dislocation.
Our results suggest that a faster rate of skill upgrading oﬀers workers a “ladder”
with which to climb to higher points on the occupational scale rather than pushing
them down a “snake” to a lower skill group or to non-employment.
These results are only preliminary. More work needs to be done to verify the robust-
ness of these results to (a) the deﬁnitions of skill groups, promotion and demotion;
(b) the measures of skill upgrading used and (c) the econometric modelling of the
process of movement.
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30Appendix A List of occupations
The following table lists the most commonly occurring occupations in each skill group
listed in order of frequency. The occupations listed account for 75% of employment in
each skill group. The PSID occupational descriptions are from the 1970 US Census
Bureau standard occupational classiﬁcation. See Hoﬀerth et al. (1998) for a full
set of codes. The BHPS occupational descriptions are from the 1980 UK standard
occupational classiﬁcation. See Taylor et al. (2003) for a full set of codes.
Occupations in each ISCO skill group, UK and US
(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Skill group 1
Janitors & sextons Cleaners, domestics
Cleaners & charwomen Packers, bottlers, canners, ﬁllers
Deliverymen & routemen Kitchen porters, hands
Freight & material handlers Caretakers
Construction laborers, except carpen-
ters’ helpers
All other labourers & related workers
Stock handlers Farm workers
Gardeners & groundskeepers, except
farm
Telephone salespersons
Packers & wrappers, except meat &
produce
Other building & civil engineering labourers nec
Maids & servants, private household
Skill group 2
Secretaries, nec Sales assistants
Truck drivers Clerks (nec)
Miscellaneous clerical workers Accounts & wages clerks, book-keepers, other ﬁnancial
clerks
Foremen, nec Drivers of road goods vehicles
Sales clerks, retail trade Other secretaries, personal assistants, typists, word proces-
sor operators nec
Cashiers Metal working production & maintenance ﬁtters
Machine operatives, miscellaneous
speciﬁed
Filing, computer & other records clerks (inc. legal con-
veyancing)
Cooks, except private household Storekeepers & warehousemen/women
Assemblers Care assistants & attendants
Automobile mechanics Counter clerks & cashiers
Estimators & investigators, nec Electricians, electrical maintenance ﬁtters
Child care workers, except private
household
Chefs, cooks
Carpenters Local government clerical oﬃcers & assistants
Waiters Civil Service administrative oﬃcers & assistants
Guards & watchmen Other childcare & related occupations nec
Heavy equipment mechanics, includ-
ing diesel
Police oﬃcers (sergeant & below)
Receptionists Counterhands, catering assistants
Fork lift & tow motor operatives Postal workers, mail sorters
Sewers & stitchers Motor mechanics, auto engineers (inc. road patrol engi-
neers)
Policemen & detectives Educational assistants
Hairdressers & cosmetologists Retail cash desk & check-out operators
Cont’d
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(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Computer & peripheral equipment op-
erators
Other plant & machine operatives nec
Food service workers, nec, except pri-
vate household
Receptionists
Checkers, examiners, & inspectors;
manufacturing
Bar staﬀ
Salesmen, retail trade Assistant nurses, nursing auxiliaries
Bank tellers Security guards & related occupations
Salesmen of services & construction Assemblers/lineworkers (electrical/electronic goods)
Miscellaneous operatives Carpenters & joiners
Shipping & receiving clerks Bus & coach drivers
Bus drivers Sewing machinists, menders, darners & embroiderers
Stock clerks & storekeepers Welding trades
Electricians Nursery nurses
Postal clerks Other food, drink & tobacco process operatives nec
Typists Fire service oﬃcers (leading ﬁre oﬃcer & below)
Welders & ﬂame-cutters Chemical, gas & petroleum process plant operatives
Machinists Plastics process operatives,moulders & extruders
Clerical supervisors, nec Plumbers, heating & ventilating engineers & related trades
Painters, construction & maintenance Gardeners, groundsmen/groundswomen
Counter clerks, except food Fork lift & mechanical truck drivers
Machine operatives, not speciﬁed Waiters, waitresses
Mail carriers, post oﬃce Assemblers/lineworkers (vehicles & other metal goods)
Plumbers & pipe ﬁtters Hairdressers, barbers
Excavating, grading, & road machine
operators
Miscellaneous mechanics & repairmen
Air conditioning, heating, & refriger-
ation
Not speciﬁed clerical workers
Skill Group 3
Nursing aides, orderlies, & attendants Nurses
Registered nurses Welfare, community & youth workers
Bookkeepers Technical & wholesale sales representatives
Sales representatives, wholesale trade Accounts & wages clerks, book-keepers, other ﬁnancial
clerks
Insurance agents, brokers, & under-
writers
Underwriters, claims assessors, brokers, investment analysts
Teacher aides, except school monitors Other sales representatives nec
Practical nurses Laboratory technicians
Prekindergarten & kindergarten
teachers
Computer operators, data processing operators, other oﬃce
machine operators
Oﬃcials & administrators; public ad-
ministration, nec
Civil Service administrative oﬃcers & assistants
Electrical & electronic engineering
technicians
Organisation & methods & work study oﬃcers
School administrators, elementary &
secondary
Local government oﬃcers (administrative & executive func-
tions)
Clinical laboratory technologists &
technicians
Matrons, houseparents
Therapists Other scientiﬁc technicians nec
Health aides, except nursing Engineering technicians






Occupational hygienists & safety oﬃcers (health & safety)
Real estate agents & brokers Buyers & purchasing oﬃcers (not retail)
Cont’d
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(a) PSID (b) BHPS
Secretaries, legal Legal secretaries
Midwives
Skill group 4
Managers & administrators, nec Other managers & administrators nec
Elementary school teachers Secondary education teaching professionals
Accountants Primary & nursery education teaching profession
Secondary school teachers Managers & proprietors in service industries nec
Restaurant, cafeteria, & bar managers Marketing & sales managers
Personnel & labor relations workers Other ﬁnancial institution & oﬃce managers nec
Bank oﬃcers & ﬁnancial managers Production, works & maintenance managers
Social workers Computer analyst/programmers
Oﬃce managers, nec Social workers, probation oﬃcers
Computer systems analysts Computer systems & data processing managers
Lawyers Higher & further education teaching professionals
Sales managers & department heads,
retail trade
Vocational & industrial trainers
Farmers (owners & tenants) Managers in building & contracting
Sales managers, except retail trade Design & development engineers
Computer specialists, nec University & polytechnic teaching professionals
Physicians, medical & osteopathic Chartered & certiﬁed accountants
Electrical & electronic engineers Treasurers & company ﬁnancial managers
Planning & quality control engineers
Bank, Building Society & Post Oﬃce managers (except self-
employed)
Personnel, training & industrial relations managers
Authors, writers, journalists
Restaurant & catering managers
Solicitors
Medical practitioners
Special education teaching professionals
Transport managers
Clergy
33Appendix B Multinomial Logit estimates
The Probit estimates in Equations (2), (3) and (4) treat promotion, demotion and
exit as three independent binary processes in order to simplify interpretation. It
might seem more realistic to model movement as a single multinomial response with
outcomes j =0 ,...,3 where
j = 0 Remain in same skill group
j = 1 Move to higher skill group
j = 2 Move to lower skill group
j =3 E x i te m p l o y m e n t
In tables B1 and B2 we report coeﬃcient estimates and marginal eﬀects from the
resulting Multinomial Logit models for both the PSID and the BHPS samples.
The marginal eﬀects and signiﬁcance levels for the probability of promotion and
demotion are largely unaﬀected by the use of a Multinomial Logit rather than a
series of Probit estimates. The only exception is in the estimates of the probabil-
ity of exiting employment (third panel in Tables B1 and B2). Here we ﬁnd some
evidence that skill upgrading does cause an increased probability of exiting employ-
ment, particularly for the bottom skill group in the PSID. However, the size of the
marginal eﬀects are far smaller than those on the probability of promotion, and so
our conclusion still holds.
The diﬀerence in the results arises because the Probit and the Multinomial Logit
models use a diﬀerent base group. The Probit estimates of the probability of exit
from employment merge j =0 ,1,2 together.
34Pr(promotion)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 -2.9782 [0.069] -0.2550 1.3270 [0.668] 0.0321
DP skill group 2 9.1972 [0.000] 1.6763 2.6898 [0.220] 0.1168
DP skill group 3 10.8836 [0.001] 1.7945 5.3305 [0.000] 0.4462
DP skill group 4 10.9026 [0.000] 1.9174 2.7539 [0.010] 0.2216 7.5203 [0.001] 0.5872
Age                           -0.0165 [0.555] 0.0016 0.0204 [0.264] 0.0026 -0.0058 [0.867] 0.0021
Age squared -0.0001 [0.786] -0.0001 -0.0005 [0.035] -0.0001 -0.0001 [0.825] 0.0000
Female                        -0.1245 [0.250] -0.0326 0.3129 [0.000] 0.0261 -0.2835 [0.012] -0.0256
12 years of education 0.0583 [0.601] 0.0195 0.5501 [0.000] 0.0501 0.3865 [0.195] 0.0393
13-15 years of education 0.4718 [0.002] 0.1034 1.0015 [0.000] 0.1106 0.5765 [0.054] 0.0620
? 16 years of education 0.6881 [0.024] 0.1377 1.6707 [0.000] 0.2514 0.9906 [0.001] 0.1196
Married                       0.0243 [0.810] 0.0211 0.1131 [0.057] 0.0115 0.2111 [0.045] 0.0182
Number of children            -0.0661 [0.200] -0.0184 -0.0480 [0.093] -0.0043 -0.1323 [0.010] -0.0128
Health limits work            -0.1688 [0.307] -0.0480 0.0899 [0.355] 0.0027 -0.1175 [0.482] -0.0114
Tenure with current employer  -0.0737 [0.000] -0.0095 -0.0360 [0.001] -0.0015 -0.0443 [0.051] -0.0024
Tenure squared 0.0027 [0.000] 0.0004 0.0016 [0.000] 0.0001 0.0015 [0.096] 0.0001
Represented by union          -0.4487 [0.054] -0.0766 -0.2845 [0.071] -0.0231 0.0799 [0.763] 0.0080
Union member                  -0.1979 [0.428] -0.0396 -0.4709 [0.007] -0.0345 -0.1691 [0.562] -0.0168
Hourly wage                   0.0531 [0.001] 0.0123 0.0041 [0.341] 0.0007 0.0012 [0.504] 0.0009
Pr(demotion)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 4.5257 [0.027] 0.1600 3.9763 [0.170] 0.2986 1.1160 [0.542] 0.1360
DP skill group 2 8.5845 [0.000] 0.7128 0.5961 [0.638] 0.0449
DP skill group 3 -1.3343 [0.564] -0.0637 2.2039 [0.180] 0.2493
DP skill group 4 -0.0236 [0.988] -0.0138 2.4946 [0.260] 0.1266
Age                           0.0119 [0.588] 0.0007 -0.0666 [0.033] -0.0038 -0.0401 [0.073] -0.0035
Age squared -0.0001 [0.627] 0.0000 0.0007 [0.092] 0.0000 0.0005 [0.064] 0.0000
Female                        -0.9167 [0.000] -0.0328 -0.3094 [0.005] -0.0303 0.0728 [0.327] 0.0049
12 years of education -0.0706 [0.488] -0.0027 0.1099 [0.563] 0.0121 -0.2402 [0.175] -0.0231
13-15 years of education -0.4818 [0.000] -0.0164 -0.1031 [0.602] -0.0080 -0.5431 [0.002] -0.0547
? 16 years of education -0.5935 [0.016] -0.0206 -0.7446 [0.001] -0.0622 -1.3672 [0.000] -0.1657
Married                       -0.2842 [0.001] -0.0096 -0.1069 [0.260] -0.0118 -0.1006 [0.187] -0.0137
Number of children            -0.0148 [0.729] -0.0004 0.0762 [0.079] 0.0071 -0.0189 [0.577] -0.0015
Health limits work            -0.2907 [0.054] -0.0102 -0.0444 [0.759] -0.0055 -0.0146 [0.899] -0.0078
Tenure with current employer  -0.0528 [0.000] -0.0011 -0.0300 [0.079] -0.0011 -0.0189 [0.152] -0.0012
Tenure squared 0.0016 [0.002] 0.0000 0.0013 [0.034] 0.0001 0.0006 [0.231] 0.0000
Represented by union          0.1541 [0.457] 0.0061 0.0556 [0.835] 0.0060 0.0943 [0.648] 0.0133
Union member                  0.2268 [0.294] 0.0104 0.3159 [0.281] 0.0327 0.0603 [0.792] 0.0085
Hourly wage                   -0.0974 [0.000] -0.0031 -0.0761 [0.000] -0.0068 -0.0375 [0.000] -0.0044
Pr(exit employment)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 -1.2451 [0.431] -0.1021 4.7734 [0.127] 0.3671 -0.3190 [0.892] -0.0349
DP skill group 2 5.6973 [0.027] 0.3076 3.4130 [0.139] 0.1913 2.4106 [0.130] 0.1666
DP skill group 3 11.2682 [0.004] 0.9138 1.1027 [0.437] 0.0552 1.1627 [0.577] 0.0598
DP skill group 4 8.4226 [0.007] 0.5673 1.2722 [0.204] 0.0913 2.8367 [0.222] 0.1561
Age                           -0.1210 [0.000] -0.0140 -0.0967 [0.000] -0.0092 -0.2207 [0.000] -0.0186 -0.1166 [0.000] -0.0079
Age squared 0.0015 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0014 [0.000] 0.0001 0.0029 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0016 [0.000] 0.0001
Female                        0.1645 [0.179] 0.0256 0.3433 [0.000] 0.0320 0.4173 [0.001] 0.0389 0.3456 [0.000] 0.0243
12 years of education -0.1771 [0.157] -0.0240 -0.3752 [0.000] -0.0402 -0.6696 [0.000] -0.0585 -0.4548 [0.044] -0.0271
13-15 years of education 0.0169 [0.927] -0.0190 -0.2692 [0.002] -0.0331 -0.8207 [0.000] -0.0687 -0.4301 [0.053] -0.0237
? 16 years of education 0.3690 [0.258] 0.0099 -0.0464 [0.752] -0.0305 -0.7684 [0.000] -0.0621 -0.6002 [0.006] -0.0267
Married                       -0.3724 [0.001] -0.0477 -0.1203 [0.027] -0.0114 0.0019 [0.985] -0.0006 0.1414 [0.148] 0.0109
Number of children            0.1114 [0.049] 0.0163 0.0248 [0.333] 0.0028 0.1013 [0.018] 0.0093 -0.0693 [0.108] -0.0048
Health limits work            0.3232 [0.050] 0.0513 0.4897 [0.000] 0.0534 0.2470 [0.064] 0.0252 0.4776 [0.000] 0.0410
Tenure with current employer  -0.1407 [0.000] -0.0140 -0.1479 [0.000] -0.0132 -0.1181 [0.000] -0.0096 -0.1017 [0.000] -0.0071
Tenure squared 0.0042 [0.000] 0.0004 0.0042 [0.000] 0.0004 0.0028 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0030 [0.000] 0.0002
Represented by union          -0.3486 [0.216] -0.0239 -0.0129 [0.929] 0.0008 -0.1817 [0.528] -0.0162 -0.1683 [0.555] -0.0124
Union member                  -0.0171 [0.955] 0.0060 -0.2744 [0.089] -0.0210 0.0374 [0.906] 0.0013 -0.1156 [0.703] -0.0086
Hourly wage                   -0.0294 [0.149] -0.0058 -0.0046 [0.831] -0.0001 -0.0094 [0.472] -0.0001 -0.0006 [0.680] 0.0004
Table B1: Multinomial Logit estimates of occupational mobility, PSID
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4Pr(promotion)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 0.0843 [0.957] -0.0022 3.7842 [0.301] 0.3310
DP skill group 2 3.8331 [0.038] 0.6381 2.0476 [0.251] 0.1152
DP skill group 3 2.0998 [0.441] 0.2900 3.1109 [0.017] 0.2063
DP skill group 4 2.6642 [0.218] 0.4095 1.7207 [0.071] 0.1102 6.2478 [0.001] 0.5876
Age                           0.0157 [0.675] 0.0074 -0.0310 [0.230] -0.0005 0.0832 [0.076] 0.0102
Age squared -0.0006 [0.165] -0.0002 0.0003 [0.348] 0.0000 -0.0012 [0.044] -0.0001
Female                        -0.4149 [0.008] -0.0753 -0.0642 [0.489] -0.0076 -0.3654 [0.013] -0.0460
12 years of education -0.1990 [0.282] -0.0284 0.3866 [0.002] 0.0300 -0.0820 [0.767] -0.0076
13-15 years of education 0.2505 [0.243] 0.0515 0.7432 [0.000] 0.0627 -0.0142 [0.958] 0.0002
? 16 years of education -0.0789 [0.797] -0.0087 1.1240 [0.000] 0.1138 -0.0158 [0.953] 0.0062
Married                       -0.1588 [0.319] -0.0222 -0.1107 [0.185] -0.0076 -0.1523 [0.293] -0.0150
Number of children            -0.0061 [0.937] -0.0042 -0.1016 [0.016] -0.0086 -0.0747 [0.328] -0.0103
Health limits work            -0.1970 [0.394] -0.0476 -0.0914 [0.474] -0.0118 -0.2471 [0.341] -0.0324
Tenure with current employer  -0.0202 [0.390] -0.0011 -0.0694 [0.000] -0.0043 -0.1029 [0.000] -0.0098
Tenure squared 0.0001 [0.846] 0.0000 0.0018 [0.004] 0.0001 0.0023 [0.068] 0.0002
Represented by union          0.2291 [0.244] 0.0434 0.0761 [0.431] 0.0066 0.3931 [0.031] 0.0357
Union member                  -0.1994 [0.384] -0.0246 -0.3239 [0.004] -0.0216 -0.3507 [0.068] -0.0337
Hourly wage                   0.0386 [0.251] 0.0112 0.1111 [0.000] 0.0083 0.0255 [0.037] 0.0042
Pr(demotion)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 5.6911 [0.005] 0.0304 4.5304 [0.212] 0.3212 5.1759 [0.008] 0.5066
DP skill group 2 5.2787 [0.004] 0.3826 3.8774 [0.000] 0.3684
DP skill group 3 0.4605 [0.865] 0.0000 2.8329 [0.059] 0.2538
DP skill group 4 -0.6398 [0.697] -0.0052 3.4420 [0.066] 0.1936
Age                           -0.0458 [0.346] -0.0001 0.0366 [0.462] 0.0035 -0.0099 [0.774] 0.0003
Age squared 0.0005 [0.418] 0.0000 -0.0004 [0.480] 0.0000 0.0000 [0.917] 0.0000
Female                        -0.3449 [0.041] -0.0021 0.2508 [0.111] 0.0214 0.2475 [0.013] 0.0198
12 years of education -0.5308 [0.002] -0.0028 -0.2432 [0.337] -0.0193 -0.1398 [0.393] -0.0122
13-15 years of education -1.0318 [0.000] -0.0048 -0.2540 [0.310] -0.0206 -0.3541 [0.031] -0.0322
? 16 years of education -0.5003 [0.033] -0.0028 -0.9761 [0.000] -0.0781 -0.7895 [0.000] -0.0779
Married                       -0.3589 [0.020] -0.0020 -0.3779 [0.011] -0.0341 0.1479 [0.138] 0.0128
Number of children            0.2021 [0.002] 0.0010 0.1967 [0.010] 0.0169 0.0149 [0.758] 0.0013
Health limits work            -0.5762 [0.028] -0.0027 0.1175 [0.632] 0.0052 0.0787 [0.675] -0.0001
Tenure with current employer  -0.0479 [0.068] -0.0002 -0.0254 [0.383] -0.0004 -0.0203 [0.277] -0.0019
Tenure squared 0.0017 [0.089] 0.0000 -0.0001 [0.913] -0.0001 0.0004 [0.603] 0.0000
Represented by union          0.5163 [0.003] 0.0030 0.4421 [0.019] 0.0318 0.1650 [0.177] 0.0181
Union member                  -0.1428 [0.479] -0.0006 -0.2339 [0.241] -0.0156 -0.0971 [0.459] -0.0091
Hourly wage                   -0.1942 [0.000] -0.0011 -0.1491 [0.000] -0.0127 -0.1064 [0.000] -0.0106
Pr(exit employment)
Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff. Coeff. p-value Marg. eff.
DP skill group 1 0.8827 [0.532] 0.0651 2.1042 [0.671] 0.0745 0.4847 [0.854] -0.0073
DP skill group 2 0.6239 [0.770] -0.0359 5.2390 [0.030] 0.2821 1.9930 [0.219] 0.0884
DP skill group 3 2.5517 [0.465] 0.2191 2.6064 [0.100] 0.1808 3.7103 [0.094] 0.1944
DP skill group 4 1.6941 [0.477] 0.1112 2.0981 [0.025] 0.1512 3.8259 [0.131] 0.1702
Age                           -0.1765 [0.000] -0.0195 -0.2570 [0.000] -0.0196 -0.2273 [0.000] -0.0153 -0.1854 [0.000] -0.0106
Age squared 0.0020 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0033 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0029 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0026 [0.000] 0.0001
Female                        0.0873 [0.657] 0.0206 0.4838 [0.000] 0.0374 0.5078 [0.006] 0.0328 0.6626 [0.000] 0.0389
12 years of education -0.1952 [0.385] -0.0155 -0.0642 [0.479] -0.0073 0.1822 [0.533] 0.0143 -0.1872 [0.383] -0.0094
13-15 years of education -0.2286 [0.428] -0.0293 0.0695 [0.475] -0.0001 0.1124 [0.710] 0.0090 -0.0586 [0.769] -0.0011
? 16 years of education -0.1836 [0.530] -0.0168 0.2682 [0.027] 0.0099 0.2674 [0.367] 0.0233 -0.1262 [0.493] -0.0018
Married                       -0.1885 [0.282] -0.0163 -0.0538 [0.498] -0.0033 0.4249 [0.032] 0.0284 0.2357 [0.072] 0.0121
Number of children            0.1176 [0.177] 0.0129 0.1914 [0.000] 0.0154 0.0377 [0.690] 0.0018 0.0302 [0.636] 0.0016
Health limits work            0.5382 [0.018] 0.0751 0.7100 [0.000] 0.0715 0.8050 [0.001] 0.0706 0.8091 [0.000] 0.0635
Tenure with current employer  -0.0858 [0.000] -0.0087 -0.0946 [0.000] -0.0068 -0.0874 [0.008] -0.0045 -0.0091 [0.714] -0.0004
Tenure squared 0.0023 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0032 [0.000] 0.0002 0.0034 [0.008] 0.0002 0.0007 [0.504] 0.0000
Represented by union          -0.1259 [0.623] -0.0195 -0.1993 [0.049] -0.0160 0.0769 [0.757] -0.0010 -0.2502 [0.127] -0.0153
Union member                  -0.3561 [0.258] -0.0313 -0.0709 [0.538] -0.0034 0.0328 [0.896] 0.0063 -0.0451 [0.801] -0.0019
Hourly wage                   -0.1724 [0.007] -0.0197 -0.0278 [0.190] -0.0028 0.0080 [0.614] 0.0012 0.0158 [0.069] 0.0016
Table B2: Multinomial Logit estimates of occupational mobility, BHPS
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4
Skill group 1 Skill group 2 Skill group 3 Skill group 4